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Introduction 
TRUEAND CORRECT KNOWLEDGE is the result of a complex process in 
which ideas and information can be checked, tested, and challenged 
continuously and without restraint by all interested parties. Many who 
adhere to this view also believe that scientific discovery and technologi- 
cal innovation become difficult or impossible in the absence of open 
communication within the research community. These assertions are 
widely held to be true among scientists and engineers. In modern 
history, however, military competition between adversaries has fueled 
pragmatic efforts to limit or discourage open communication of ideas 
and information in many fields of research. 
Scientific and technical information is a major product of federally 
sponsored research. National scientific and technical information pol- 
icy, like many broad areas of government concern, is not anywhere 
articulated in a comprehensive form. Agencies that sponsor basic and 
applied research in support of broad mission needs-such as the Depart- 
ments of Defense and Energy and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA)-each have their own policies and practices for 
dissemination and access to information produced. Those seeking to 
understand scientific and technical information policy must derive it 
from numerous statutes, legislative histories, regulations, and executive 
branch directives. Policies for restricting the availability or communica-
tion of scientific and technical information are similarly mandated by a 
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variety of government edicts. One purpose that many of the edicts have 
in common is to restrict or prevent the transfer of militarily useful 
technology to other nations. 
An unclassified report released in September 1985 by Secretary of 
Defense Caspar W. Weinberger states the current case for caution in 
determining the availability of scientific and technological information 
with military applications.’ The report, prepared by the U.S. intelli- 
gence community. argues that Western technology is being systemati- 
cally acquired legally and illegally by “intricately organized, highly 
effective collection programs specifically targeted to improve Soviet 
military weapon systems.” Although the value of these programs for 
Soviet technological development and advancement cannot be mea- 
sured, acquisition of Western equipment and technical documents are 
estimated to benefit all Soviet military research projects. In the view of 
the Department of Defense (DOD), assimilation of Western technology 
by the Soviet Union is so broad that the United States andother Western 
nations are thus subsidizing the Soviet military buildup. 
While undesired technology transfer to the Soviet Union is not the 
only impetus for regulating the flow of scientific and technical informa- 
tion, such transfer is currently the driving force cited by federal officials 
in support of a vigorous technology security campaign. Secrecy (here 
associated with information security classification procedures) is not 
the only tool being used by federal agencies to inhibit acquisition of 
scientific and technical information by U.S.adversaries. Within the past 
few years the government has sought to develop and implement proce- 
dures intended to keep certain categories of unclassified information 
out of the public domain, yet widely accessible by the research commu- 
nity and industry of the United States and its allies. Since mid-1984, the 
government has also sought to clarify what types of scientific and 
technical information will remain available for unrestricted circulation 
within the United States and international research communities. 
This commentary will review and discuss restrictions imposed by 
the federal government on dissemination of scientific and technical 
information. The primary statutory and administrative mechanisms for 
controlling scientific and technical information will be explained. 
Commentary concerning the wisdom of controls on such information 
will be reviewed. Finally, the implications of the current system of 
restrictions will be examined. 
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How Restrictions are Imposed 
The strongest statutory bases for restrictions on scientific and tech- 
nical information are found in the Invention Secrecy Act and the 
Atomic Energy Act. Executive branch discretion and interpretation 
have played a major role in imposing restrictions based on the Export 
Administration Act and the Arms Export Control Act. A series of 
executive orders have established and maintained the security classifica- 
tion program without any statutory basis. 
Before discussing these mechanisms for restricting dissemination 
of scientific and technical information, it is useful to examine National 
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189, signed by President Reagan on 
21 September 1985. This directive is intended to set forth current admin- 
istration policy on the dissemination of information resulting from 
basic and applied research sponsored by the federal government. 
According to the directive: 
It is the policy of this Administration that, to the maximum 
extent possible, the products of fundamental research remain 
unrestricted. It is also the policy of this Administration that, 
where the national security requires control, the mechanism 
for control of information generated during federally-funded 
fundamenal research in science, technology and engineering 
at colleges, universities and laboratories is classification. Each 
federal government agency is responsible for: a) determining 
whether classification is appropriate prior to the award of a 
research grant, contract, or cooperative agreement and, if so, 
controlling the research results through standard classifica-
tion. No  restrictions may be placed upon the conduct or report-
ing of federally-funded fundamental research that has not 
received national security classification, except as provided in 
applicable U.S. Statutes.2 
The label fundamental research was not commonly used asa descriptive 
term within the scientific and engineering research community prior to 
release of the directive in draft form in May 1984. According to Depart-
ment of Defense officials, the term was deliberately chosen both to 
convey the nature of research which would likely fall within the scope of 
the policy, and to allow each relevant individual federal agency to 
formulate an operational definition of the term best suited to its particu- 
lar security needs3 NSDD 189 itself provides only a general definition: 
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“Fundamental research” means basic and applied research in science 
and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and 
shared broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished 
from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, 
production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily 
are restricted for proprietary or national security reason^.^ 
In a memorandum conveying NSDD 189 to the heads of executive 
branch departments and agencies, the White House stressed the policy 
“preserves the ability of the agencies to control unclassified information 
using legislated authority provided expressly for that purpose in appli- 
cable U.S. statutes.” 
Proposed revisions to the Department of Commerce regulations 
which implement the Export Administration Act also employ the con- 
cept of fundamental research and contain the same definition used in 
NSDD 189.5 According to the proposed regulations, information aris- 
ing during or resulting from fundamental research qualifies for unre- 
stricted export to any destination under a General License for Technical 
Data Available to All Destinations (General License GTDA). A General 
License GTDA is roughly equivalent to a regulatory exemption requir- 
ing no prior notification to the Department of Commerce for the export 
of qualifying categories of technical data. Scientific or technical infor- 
mation that is already publicly available or is made public by the 
transaction in question, educational information, and information in 
certain patent applications also qualify for this license. 
The regulations further spell out explicit rules-of-thumb that will 
be used to identify research qualifying as “fundamental research.” 
Research conducted by scientists or engineers working for a university 
will normally be considered fundamental research, unless the university 
or the researchers accept any restrictions on free and immediate publica- 
tion of scientific and technical information resulting from the research 
project.6 Research conducted by scientists or engineers working for a 
federal agency or a federally funded research and development center 
(FFRDC) may be designated as fundamental research under any 
appropriate system devised by the agency or center. Research conducted 
for a business corporation will be considered fundamental research only 
if the researchers are free to make scientific and technical information 
resulting from the research publicly available without restriction or 
delay based on proprietary considerations. 
Almost one year prior to the issuance of NSDD 189, the Department 
of Defense made known its operational criteria for determining whether 
research is fundamental. According to a memorandum issued by the 
under secretary of defense for research and engineering, all unclassified 
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contract research supported by funds allocated from Department of 
Defense budget category 6.1 is considered to be f~ndamenta l .~  Unclassi-
fied research performed on a university campus and supported by 6.2 
funding is "with rare exceptions" also considered fundamental. Univer- 
sity researchers are to be informed in advance of any Department of 
Defense grant or contract whether the proposed research will be consid- 
ered fundamental, and, if not, what contract controls are proposed by 
the department to restrict dissemination of research data.' Contract 
research projects performed in off-campus university facilities that are 
not supported with 6.1 funds generally are not considered fundamental. 
Some discretion in assigning the fundamental label is allowed for 
research performed for the Department of Defense in federal laborato- 
ries under both budget categories 6.1 and 6.2. 
Department of Defense officials have indicated that research spon- 
sored by the federal government that is not considered fundamental may 
still be free of restriction^.^ However, scientific and technical informa- 
tion that remains unclassified can be considered by the government to be 
restricted under the Export Administration Act or the Arms Export 
Control Act if a researcher is obligated to a contractual agreement with 
the sponsoring agency that restricts dissemination of information aris- 
ing during or resulting from a research project. As indicated earlier, 
neither statute offers a well-defined basis for restricting the flow of 
unclassified information. Since the constitutionality of direct applica- 
tion of the statutes to scientific and technical information has been 
questioned, the government has sought to rely primarily on contractual 
agreements to bring such information under the control of the imple- 
menting export regulations. By deciding what research projects should 
be subject to contractual restrictions, the sponsoring agency essentially 
determines what information will be subject to export controls." The 
Department of Defense in 1983 secured an exemption to the Freedom of 
Information Act that permits the department to withhold from public 
disclosure information i t  determines to be subject to export 
restrictions." 
The Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended by Congress in 
1985, mandates the use of export controls to the extent necessary "to 
restrict the export of goods and technology which wouldmakea signifi- 
cant contribution to the military potential of countries which would 
prove detrimental to the national security of the United States."" The 
act defines technology to mean: 
The information and knowhow (whether in tangible form, such as 
models, prototypes, drawings, sketches, diagrams, blueprints, or 
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manuals, or in intangible form, such as training or technical services) 
that can be used to design, produce, manufacture, utilize, or recon- 
struct goods, includin computer software and technical data, but not %the goods themselves. 
The act requires that a list of militarily critical technologies, to be 
developed by the Department of Defense, be added to the control list of 
goods and technology subject to national security export contr01s.l~ 
While the Department of Defense has developed its list of critical tech- 
nologies, it has not yet been added to the control list. The department’s 
list is widely regarded as a list of all advanced technologies that can be 
applied to the development and manufacture of military systems. 
In the 1985 amendments, the following declaration of policy was 
added to the act: 
I t  is the policy of the United States to sustain vigorous scientific 
enterprise. T o  do so involves sustaining the ability of scientists and 
other scholars freely tocommunicate research findings, in accordance 
with applicable provisions of law, by means of publication, teaching, 
conferences, and other forms of scholarly e~change.’~ 
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which originally proposed 
the amendment, has indicated that the phrase “in accordance with 
applicable provisions of law” is intended to encompass constraints 
imposed by executive classification authority and contractual agree- 
ments between researchers and their sponsors based on national securi- 
ty, proprietary or trade secret considerations. The committee added the 
policy statement to the amendments because of concern that an overly 
broad interpretation of the act could seriously limit “the legitimate 
scientific communication process on which scientific productivity in 
the United States depends.” In the view of the committee, existing 
government authority to declare material classified, to control work 
performed under contracts, and to limit the entry to and movement 
within the United States of foreign nationals is adequate to meet U.S. 
security needs.16 
The Arms Export Control Act provides authority for restrictions on 
the export of technical data related to defense arti~1es.l~ The Interna- 
tional Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) in implementing this sta- 
tute define technical data to include: 
Information which is not classified pursuant to U.S. laws and regula- 
tions and which is directly related to the design, engineering, develop- 
ment, production, processing, manufacture, operation, overhaul, 
repair, maintenance, or reconstruction of defense articles. This 
includes blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, instructions, 
computer software and documentation. This also includes informa- 
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tion which advances the state of the art of articles on the U.S. Muni- 
tions List.’* 
Information in the public domain, and general mathematical andengi- 
neering information only indirectly useful in the defense field are not 
considered to constitute technical data. The ITAR does not yet explic- 
i t ly  employ the concept of fundamental research, and thus the Arms 
Export Control Act could be considered one of the “applicable U.S. 
statutes” available to restrict unclassified technical data arising from 
such research. 
The dissemination controls on federally sponsored research 
imposed by a combination of contractual agreements and the export 
control statutes are generally not restrictive enough to enshroud scien- 
tific and technical information in secrecy. Unclassified documents con- 
taining scientific and technical information developed under the 
sponsorship of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration fall 
into six categories: (1) ITAR documents; (2) Expert Administration 
Regulations (EAR) documents; (3) “For Early Domestic Dissemina- 
tion” documents; (4)“Limited Distribution” documents; ( 5 )documents 
disclosing an invention; or (6) publicly available document^.'^ 
JTAR documents bear a notice stating that the information falls 
under the purview of the US. munitions list and thus should not be 
transferred to foreign nationals in the United States or abroad without 
specific approval. A notice on EAR documents states that thedocument 
“may not be transferred to foreign nationals of proscribed destinations 
without specific approval.” Both types of documents are available to 
U S .  citizens and may be available without an export license to scientists 
and engineers in other countries under the terms of specific 
government-to-government technical coopera tion agreements. 
Documents not otherwise restricted under the provisions of ITAR 
or EAR that contain the results of NASA research anddevelopment that 
have significant potential for domestic, commercial, or governmental 
benefit are designated as restricted distribution documents. “For Early 
Domestic Distribution” documents are those containing technical data 
determined to be applicable to commercial products or processes which 
could be brought to market within a reasonable time period and which 
would contribute to a recipient’s share of the market because the result- 
ing product or process will reach the market sooner or will be superior 
to those of competitors. Such documents bear the following notice: 
Because of its significant early commercial potential, this informa- 
tion, which has been developed under a U.S. Government program, is 
being disseminated within the United States in advance of general 
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publication. This information may be duplicated and used by the 
recipient with the express limitation that it not be published. Release 
of this information to other domestic parties by the recipient shall be 
made subject to these limitations. Foreign release may be made only 
with prior NASA approval and appropriate export licenses.20 
This designation has been used by NASA since 1973. Starting in 1985, 
documents can also be designated by NASA as “Limited Distribution” 
documents. Such documents contain technical data determined to relate 
to a proof-of-concept ora major breakthrough that would allow a major 
technological improvement that could be applied in a commercial or 
governmental aerospace system or subsystem within five years. Copies 
of these documents bear the following notice: “Because of its significant 
technological potential, this information, which has been developed 
under a U.S. Government program, is being given a limiteddistribution 
whereby advanced access is provided for use by domestic interests.”21 
The centerpiece of Department of Defense dissemination policy is 
also a procedure for marking all newly created technical documents 
with distribution statements. The statements are for purposes of defin-
ing availability of technical documents within the defense community 
and indicating how requests for documents from outside the depart- 
ment should be handled. The procedures apply to all technical docu- 
ments generated by research, development, test, and evaluation 
programs funded by the Department of Defense.% 
Seven distribution statements can be used by Department of 
Defense components that generate or are responsible for technical docu- 
ments. Documents with distribution statement A are approved for pub- 
lic release and unlimited distribution. Documents with statements B, C, 
D, or E are automatically available to defined entities. Requests from 
other parties must be specifically approved by the controlling office 
within the Department of Defense. These four statements may be ap- 
plied to classified, declassified, and unclassified documents. 
B documents are available to U.S. government agencies. Justifica- 
tions for assigning this availability include protection in accordance 
with the desires of a foreign government furnishing the information; 
protection of information not owned by the U.S. government that is 
received from a contractor with the understanding that i t  may not be 
transmitted outside the U.S. government; protection of the results of test 
and evaluation of commercial products or military hardware when 
disclosure may cause unfair advantage or disadvantage to the manufac- 
turer; and protection of technical or operational data from automatic 
dissemination under the International Exchange Program. C docu-
ments are available to U.S. government agencies and their contractors, 
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and require protection for information and technical data that advance 
current technology or describe new technology in an area of potentially 
significant military application. D documents are available to the 
Department of Defense and its contractors, and may concern a system or 
hardware in the development or concept stage. E documents are avail- 
able only within the Department of Defense. F documents are available 
only as directed by the controlling office and are generally technical 
documents that are classified. 
For documents marked with distribution statement X,distribution 
is authorized to government agencies and private individuals or enter-
prises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data. The Depart- 
ment of Defense Authorization Act of 1984 contained a provision 
exempting technical data deemed subject to the export control laws 
from disclosure b the Department of Defense under the Freedom of 
Information Act ‘The Department of Defense has broadly interpreted 
this authority to permit the withholding of subject technical data from 
any type of public disclosure. The implementing regulations set forth 
requirements for eligibility to obtain such data from the Department of 
Defense.24 Private firms and individuals must sign a contractual agree- 
ment which certifies compliance with U.S. export control regulations; 
that recipients of the data are U.S. citizens or persons admitted to the 
United States for permanent residence; that data are needed to bid or 
perform on a contract with the U.S. government or for other approved 
purposes; and that access to the data will not be provided to persons 
other than employees or persons acting on the recipient’s behalf with- 
out the permission of the Department of Defense. The department 
reserves the right to deny requests for subject technical data if the data 
are judged to be unrelated to the purpose for which the requestor is 
certified; if the significance of the data for military purposes is such that 
release for purposes other than direct support of approved activities may 
jeopardize an important technological or operational military advan- 
tage of the United States; or if credible and sufficient information is 
known that the requestor has violated U.S. export control law, violated 
its certification, made a certification in bad faith, or made an omission 
or misstatement of material fact. 
The Atomic Energy Act, first passed by Congress in 1946, requires 
that most information relating to nuclear weapons and nuclear energy 
be designated as Restricted Damz5 Restricted Data is defined in the act as 
“all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic 
weapons; (2)the production of special nuclear material; or (3)the use of 
special nuclear material in the production of energy.”= Information 
within this definition is “born classified” as a government secret unless 
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and until i t  has been declassified by the government. A significant 
amount of information falling within the definition of Restricted Data 
has been declassified. Although the designation has generally been 
applied to data generated by government employees or with govern- 
ment sponsorship, the information control provisions of the act have 
been applied to any information falling within the definition of Res-
tricted Data regardless of where the information ~riginated.’~ The law 
requires any person making any invention or discovery generally useful 
in the field of atomic energy to file a report with the Department of 
Energy within six months giving a complete description of it, unless a 
patent application has been filed. 
At the request of the Department of Energy, the Atomic Energy Act 
was amended in 1981 to authorize withholding of unclassified informa- 
tion from release if disclosure could result in a significant adverse effect 
on the health and safety of the public or the common defense. Justifica- 
tion is required that release of the information would significantly 
increase the likelihood of illegal production of nuclear weapons: or 
theft, diversion, or sabotage of nuclear materials, equipment, or 
facili ties.28 
The Invention Secrecy Act permits the government to block the 
granting of a patent and prohibit an inventor from disclosing the 
invention to anyone else when, in the view of a defense agency, publica- 
tion or disclosure of an invention would be detrimental to the national 
security.29 A secrecy order issued by the patent commissioner is effective 
for not more than one year, subject to a possible renewal. Two alterna- 
tives are currently being worked out by the Patent andTrademark Office 
in cooperation with the Department of Defense. The first option would 
allow the issuance of a patent along with an order which limits use or 
disclosure of the invention to classified projects of the government. A 
second option would allow the issuance of an order which limits disclo- 
sure to persons employed by the originating company. Publication of 
such a patent would require an export license, as would the export of a 
product or process making use of the invention. Under both options the 
patent would be withheld until the order was re~cinded.~’ 
Information can be classified for national security purposes pursu- 
ant to a program that is currently defined by Executive Order 12356.31 
Classification at one of three levels-top secret, secret, and 
confidential-can be applied to information if it concerns “scientific, 
technological, or economic matters relating to the national security,” or 
“capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the 
national security.” Basic scientific research information not clearly 
related to the national security cannot be classified. Access to classified 
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information is provided only upon a determination both of an individu- 
al’s trustworthiness, by way of a background investigation, and that 
such access is essential to the accomplishment of authorized govern- 
ment activities. 
Review of Commentary 
Application of all types of restrictions to scientific and technical 
information has long been a controversial matter within government 
and the research community. Discussion and debate on the wisdom of 
imposing controls on information resulting from research supported by 
the federal government has occurred throughout the past four decades. 
In 1948, Vannevar Bush addressed the issue in a manner not antagonis- 
tic to the current multilayered system of controls: 
We can compete in the open with any totalitarian power and give 
them cards and spades as far as fundamental science-the foundation 
on which development rests-is concerned....But in the applications 
which grow through development out of fundamental science, it is a 
different matter. The critical point may well be reached far earlier in 
the process than we are accustomed to think, and ...we must be alert to 
it and ready at once to erect the defenses of protection and security 
which it demands3’ 
Congressional hearings held during the 1950s first brought atten- 
tion to complaints by leading scientists that technological secrecy prac- 
ticed by the federal government was more damaging than beneficial to 
U S .  national security.33 The issues aired then are still being debated 
today-Defense and Commerce Department directives and regulations 
designed to cut down on the flow of technical information, how the flow 
of militarily valuable technological know-how topotential enemies can 
be confined without unduly harming U S .  interests, and whether there 
is too much uncertainty about what information should be classified or 
restricted. 
During the hearings, scientists testified that the United States since 
World War I1 has “steadily lost ground relative to our competitors until 
now there is serious question whether the U.S. actually retains leader- 
ship in certain critically important areas of military technology.” They 
insisted that trying to keep secret broad areas of knowledge was futile. 
Determined foreign data collection activities were seen to be seldom 
blocked while internal information flows were obstructed.% Lloyd 
Berkner delivered the strongest indictment of U.S. secrecy and character- 
ized the then prevailing attitudes as follows: 
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As a nation we have become neurotic, so preoccupied by imagined 
aches and pains that we have lost sight of our great strength. We allow 
ourselves to believe that the system of Soviet communism has ele- 
ments of strength superior to our own when we could readily reason 
that a totalitarian socialism can only follow-never lead-our true 
system of free enterprise that exploits diversity. We have been misled 
to adopt some of the Soviet methods with consequent suspicion, 
mistrust, divisiveness and loss of leadership that always follow such 
methods. We see spies under every chair and from the consequent fear, 
prescribe remedies that sap our strength. In rooting them out, let’s 
keep our sense of proportion. Our strength should come from our 
leadershig and unity, a superiority which no espionage can 
mnquer. 
In 1970, a Defense Science Board task force headed by Frederick 
Seitz focused on secrecy in military research and development. In 
addressing specific questions posed by the director of defense research 
and engineering, the task force considered security classification from 
the national long range and short range viewpoints. The task force 
generally concluded that the Department of Defense security classifica- 
tion system required major surgery if it was to function properly in the 
defense, national, and international environment. The information 
most deserving of classification was deemed to be that which industry 
often treats as proprietary. The task force argued that security classifica- 
tion was “most profitably applied in areas close to design and produc- 
tion, having to do with detailed drawings and special techniques of 
manufacture rather than research and most exploratory development.” 
The task force concluded that the amount of scientific and technical 
information which was held to be classified could advantageously be 
decreased as much as 90 percent by limiting the amount of information 
classified and the duration of its classification. The task force recom- 
mended that as a general rule, research and early development should be 
unclassified. Classification was recommended only when development 
of military systems approaches the “blueprint” stage. In particular, the 
“confidential” category was considered to be inappropriate for research 
and development programs, and “special access” limitations were 
judged to be more likely to seriously impede difficult technical pro- 
grams than not.% 
Restrictions on scientific and technical information based on 
export control laws received heightened attention subsequent to a study 
by the Defense Science Board in 1976. A panel chaired by Fred Bucy 
argued that design and manufacturing know-how are the principal 
elements of strategic technology control. Technology contained in ap- 
plied research or development was deemed to be of possible significance 
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in selected areas. The categories of export that were seen as deserving 
primary emphasis were: (1) arrays of design and manufacturing know- 
how; (2) keystone manufacturing, inspection, and test equipment; and 
(3) products accompanied by sophisticated operation, application, or 
maintenance kn~w-how.~’ This premise helped set in motion more 
vigorous efforts to apply export control regulations to transfer and 
dissemination of technical knowledge related to militarily useful 
advanced technology. 
In 1982, a Defense Science Board task force study on university 
responsiveness to national security requirements found that the shift in 
emphasis of export controls from product control to control of 
technology-including products, equipment, and arrays of know- 
how-complicated relations between the Department of Defense and 
the university research community. The task force noted that 
researchers in universities are driven by goals and motivations quite 
different than those found in industry, where proprietary restraints act 
to inhibit the flow of important know-how. Since prestige andrecogni- 
tion are attained in academia by being the first to publish a new idea or 
concept, the task force saw it as crucial that the Department of Defense 
be sensitive to differences between industry and universities in its pur- 
suit of the control of technologies that are critical in a military sense. 
Stating that control of technical information generated by research 
could be a major obstacle to restoring a healthy relationship between 
universities and the Department of Defense, the task force recommended 
that clear guidelines be established for dissemination of technical infor- 
mation in Defense-funded university research. The task force urged that 
the guidelines not be overly restrictive and not inhibit the legitimate 
flow of scientific information. A dialogue between the government and 
the university community since the issuance of this task force report has 
led to the policies on fundamental research articulated in NSDD 189 and 
the general license provisions of the Export Administration 
Regula tions.% 
A study on scientific communication and national security by a 
panel chaired by Dale Corson recommended that no restriction of any 
kind limiting access or communication should be applied to any area of 
university basic or applied research, unless i t  involves a technology 
meeting all of the following criteria: the technology is developing 
rapidly, and the time from basic science to application is short; the 
technology has identifiable direct military applications or is dual-use 
and involves process or production-related techniques; transfer of the 
technology would give the Soviet Union a significant near-term mil- 
itary benefit; and the United States is the only source of information 
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about the technology, or other friendly nations that could also be the 
source have control systems as secure as ours. The panel recommended 
classification for university research meeting these criteria. Noting that 
most universities will not undertake classified work, the panel recom- 
mended as an alternative written agreements no more restrictive than a 
prohibition of direct participation in research projects by nationals of 
designated foreign countries, and a requirement for simultaneous sub- 
mission of manuscripts to a publisher and the contract officer with a 
sixty-day period for the sponsoring federal agency to seek 
m~dif ica t ions .~~ 
Although concluding that the criteria suggested by the Corson 
panel are unworkable, Department of Defense officials have opted for 
use of contractual controls on university research not considered funda- 
mental. The potential use of classification to restrict fundamental 
research is sanctioned by NSDD 189. 
Analyses from a variety of perspectives of the tension between 
controls on the export of technology and the environment required for 
the advancement of science and technology in the United States indicate 
areas of agreement and disagreement as to the widsom of controlling 
unclassified scientific and technical information arising from federally 
sponsored research. Roland Schmitt sees a “Catch-22” dilemma in 
seeking to protect the products of an asset that can be destroyed by the act 
of protection-a system of research and development that is highly 
interactive and largely open. 
Schmitt agrees with what has become a consensus view that all 
areas of fundamental scientific and engineering research should remain 
unfettered by controls including research of military interest. With 
respect to unclassified technical data that is not deemed fundamental, 
Schmitt tacitly accepts some level of control by urging that procedures 
be developed “for screening foreign nationals who come to the United 
States for research training or technical employment so that they can 
have the same freedom of access tounclassified technical information as 
U.S. citizens.”40 Other observers and institutions regard any attempt to 
control technical information as counterproductive for national secur- 
ity. Stephen Unger argues that openness supports national security: 
The free exchange of knowledge among scientists and engineers is a 
key factor in promoting progress. An integral part of the scientific 
process is the publication and wide dissemination of new ideas, 
discoveries, and experimental results. By this means, critics may 
detect errors or faulty reasoning, point out possible improvements, or 
confirm the validity of what was done. Colleagues (often complete 
strangers) may suggest solutions or alternative approaches to prob-
lems raised. They may find applications other than those that the 
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author had in mind-sometimes in entirely different fields. Mention 
in a technical paper of unsuccessful approaches to a problem helps 
others avoid wasting effort in exploring blind alleys. Publication of 
successful solutions to problems makes it unnecessary for others to 
expend time and energy in solving them again, although it is com- 
mon for a solution to inspire others to find better, often simpler, 
solutions to the same problems. They may also eneralize published wsolutions to cover broader classes of problems. 
Resistance to controls on communication of unclassified technical 
information is centered in the scientific and engineering professional 
societies. These societies seek to advance fields of knowledge by promot- 
ing open presentation, discussion, peer review, publication, and dis- 
semination of technical information to all who want it, regardless of 
nationality. Through publication of journals and the sponsorship of 
meetings, societies seek to create a permanent record of knowledge 
generated in scientific and engineering fields. By one self-evaluation: 
From a neo-protectionist perspective the Institute for Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers must rank as a significant threat to Western and 
U.S. national security. As publisher of over fifty state-of-the-art tech- 
nical journals the IEEE provides a direct conduit for critical informa- 
tion transfer across national boundaries, although in view of the 
international authorship this is not ~nidirectional.~' 
In a September 1985 letter to the secretary of defense, the elected 
presidents of twelve scientific and engineering societies emphasized that 
the broad range of unclassified information subject to Department of 
Defense controls places limits on the exchange of scientific and techni- 
cal information that, in turn, are detrimental to the national security 
interests of the nation. In the view of the societies: 
In science and engineering research, the open exchange of informa- 
tion ensures that critical peer review is applied to new advances, 
provides valuable cross-fertilization of ideas and helps avoid duplica- 
tion of effort. One of the principal missions of our organizations is to 
encourage and provide opportunities for such exchange and thereby 
to promote advances in the fields of knowledge which we represent. 
Since such advances are also important to national security, we feel 
impelled to advise you of the counterproductive consequences of the 
current DoD policies and of the limitations in our ability to respond 
to them?3 
Of particular concern to the signatories is a directive, first proposed by 
the Department of Defense earlier in the year, setting policy for the 
presentation of scientific and technical papers based on research spon- 
sored by the d e ~ a r t m e n t . ~ ~  The guidance bars approval of unclassified 
papers judged to contain export-controlled information unless physical 
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access to the presentation will be limited to government employees and 
individuals certified by the department as eligible to receive export- 
controlled technical data. Such “unclassified/limited access” presenta- 
tions were first required on an ad hoc basis by the Department of 
Defense during a meeting of the Society for Photo-Optical Instrumenta- 
tion Engineers in April 1985. 
Where are We Headed? 
Dissemination restrictions on a significant body of unclassified 
information arising from government-sponsored research appear now 
to play a substantial role in national scientific and technical informa- 
tion policy. What is unclear is whether the availability and use of 
restrictions on unclassified technical data will lead to a decrease in the 
use of classification authority. According to Sumner Benson, the Rea- 
gan administration considered establishing a fourth category of classifi-
cation, below the existing three categories of confidential, secret, and 
top secret. This approach was rejected as too expensive and cumbersome 
since classification controls require specified physical facilities to house 
the documents, detailed procedures for controlling the documents, and 
costly and time-consuming security clearances for personnel who will 
have access to the documents. As an alternative, the application of 
procedures based in export regulations rather than classification is seen 
by proponents as allowing much greater flexibility in disseminating 
technical information while still inhibiting Soviet access to informa-
tion subject to the controls.45 
In the absence of substantially decreased use of the current classifi- 
cation system, it is clear that export controls will lessen the availability 
of U.S. government-sponsored technical information within the inter- 
national research community. Technical documents arising from many 
categories of unclassified research, which in the past were likely to be 
made publicly available, will now only be accessible to defined sectors 
in the research community. 
Reliance by the government on contractual agreements between 
researchers and their sponsors to bring scientific and technical informa- 
tion within the purview of export control statutes from the start of a 
research project may make the controls legally defensible. No consensus 
has been reached on whether use of contractual agreements to keep 
information out of the public domain makes sense from a public policy 
perspective. Recognizing that export controls are unlikely to com-
pletely halt the undesired transfer of militarily useful knowledge to our 
military adversaries, defense officials argue that making the acquisition 
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activities of our adversaries more difficult and expensive will hinder the 
advance of their military technologies and bolster U.S. national securi- 
ty. Critics question whether the increased transaction costs associated 
with acquisition of export-controlled information by scientists and 
engineers in the United States and friendly nations may similarly hinder 
the advance of Western military and civilian technology. Since a signifi- 
cant portion of the controls on unclassified information now in place 
are new, their impact, both on Soviet and friendly acquisition of export- 
controlled knowledge, cannot yet be measured. 
The “red-tape” burden associated with the new controls could, at 
least in theory, be substantially less than would have been the case if 
such controls had been expanded a decade ago. For example, partial 
automation of the certification, access approval, and document han- 
dling systems associated with implementation by the Department of 
Defense of its policy of selective dissemination of certain categories of 
unclassified technical data could make access by eligible individuals 
and enterprises only marginally different than obtaining publicly avail- 
able documents from the department. Actual experience with access has 
yet to be assessed. 
The physical safeguards expected by the government for export- 
controlled information have not been made clear. Such information 
cannot be kept in publicly accessible library collections, and this alone 
may hinder productive access. Industrial users may experience little 
difficulty in handling controlled documents since existing procedures 
for managing proprietary information may be common and familiar. 
Export-controlled knowledge poses particular problems for many 
academic research institutions. The large population of foreign nation- 
als on most university campuses makes even minimal safeguards awk- 
ward. Faculty may utilize government documents much less extensively 
than in the past if they cannot freely share the information with their 
students regardless of nationality. Over the long term, this may reduce 
the value of academic teaching and research in fields substantially 
supported by government research and development funding. 
Export-controlled knowledge also poses difficult choices for some 
professional societies. Between restrictions that may discriminate 
against members who are citizens of nations with less than complete 
official access to U.S. technology and the difficulties associated with 
access by academic researchers, society effectiveness and the value of 
membership may be reduced whether a society accepts “un-
classifiedlrestricted access” sessions or not. Some societies could be faced 
with a choice of facilitating the sharing of all unclassified ideas among 
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fewer individuals or facilitating the sharing of a smaller body of infor- 
mation among all members. The creation of barriers to participation in 
U.S. professional society meetings by foreign scientists and engineers 
may also contribute to decreased society effectiveness and sharing of 
information. This is a matter of great concern to the scientific and 
engineering societies since leadership in some areas of technology 
resides within other nations. 
Complaints from within the military research establishment point 
to further possible effects of procedures designed to prevent public 
dissemination of unclassified information with military applications. 
It has been argued that such restrictions are making it difficult for the 
national laboratories to recruit and retain the best researchers. One 
laboratory official analyzed the situation as follows: 
How can [researchers] grow professionally if their work cannot be widely 
discussed or presented for peer review? How can they be rewarded without 
the opportunity to publish in the open archival literature? What this 
means is that we have a great deal of difficulty acquiring experienced 
people. We have to grow them ourselves.46 
Conclusions 
It is not difficult to accept the fact that the Soviet Union has a 
vigorous program for legally and illegally obtaining scientific and 
technical information relating to Western technology that is valuable 
for the development of military systems. The legal collection efforts are 
certainly duplicated to a greater or lesser degree by both public and 
private sector entities in most technologically active nations for both 
civilian and military purposes. The use of espionage in conjunction 
with comprehensive monitoring of publicly available information is a 
logical and cost-effective tactic for enhancing the rate of advancement of 
Soviet military technology. The reality of an arms race and multilateral 
technology embargoes make such acquisition efforts a rational course of 
action. Solely within the context of military competition, efforts to 
hinder the Soviet acquisition of Western technology serve an important 
policy role. 
The costs and benefits to national security of restrictions on the 
dissemination of scientific and techincal information with military 
application have clearly not been definitively assessed and may not be 
measurable. Consequently, there is no consensus within the research 
community that is broadly supportive of dissemination restrictions as a 
component of national security policy. On paper, the current array of 
controls on scientific and technical information appears logical from a 
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military perspective. In theory, the restrictions may permit researchers 
to continue to have access to state-of-the-art government-sponsored 
research without significant transaction costs. Yet the history of govern- 
ment is rife with examples of well-intentioned policies that respond to 
particular problems and, when implemented, prove to have unintended 
counterproductive effects. Simply because there has been so little agree- 
ment about the efficacy of dissemination restrictions on scientific and 
technical information, these policies may be at risk of having unfortu- 
nate implications for the advancement of both military and civilian 
research in the United States. 
Much recent attention has been devoted to the unwieldy aspects of 
the classification system-the volume of information that is classified 
by the government, the number of people that consequently must hold 
clearances, and the difficulties of adequately screening and policing 
cleared personnel. The recommendations of the Defense Science Board 
task force on secrecy, in combination with the system now in place to 
control unclassified technical information, offer one alternative that 
could be usefully considered by the government toease the strains on the 
information security system. Declassification of most technical infor- 
mation now currently classified, along with continued control of such 
information using the new procedures for limiting dissemination of 
unclassified information, may yield broad benefits to military and 
civilian research and development. 
Despite general talk of “regulatory impact assessments” to be con- 
ducted prior to new government regulations, the federal government 
does not systematically weigh the broad implications of its controls on 
scientific and technical information. It is the unwantedresponsibility of 
the research community to document the costs of regulation and seek 
relief if serious disruptions in the advancement of science and technol- 
ogy can be proven. The government and the research community have 
struggled with defining the tradeoffs between national security and 
openness in science and technology for much of the post-World War 11 
era. The process of determining an optimal balance between openness 
and secrecy promises to continue. 
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